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Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variant protocols are highly attractive due
to its advantage of overcoming the well-known rate-loss limit for QKD protocols, i.e. R 6 log2(1−η)
with η standing for the channel transmittance. These protocols can be divided into two types,
with phase randomization from [0, pi] and without phase randomization in code mode. Here, we
generalize the two types into a unified protocol, where Alice and Bob prepare coherent states with
2M (M ∈ {1, 2, 3...}) different phases. Moreover, our security proof indicates that the achievable
distance becomes longer with M exponentially increasing, as a trade-off, the secret key rate will be
lowered at short distance due to phase postselection. Numerical simulations show that the protocol
with M = 2 may be the best choice in experiment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] provides two
distant parties (Alice and Bob) a secure random bit string
against any eavesdropper (Eve) guaranteed by the law of
quantum mechanics. During last three decades, QKD
has been developed both in theory and experiment [3–8],
it is on the way to a wide range of implemention. Among
all QKD experiments before, there are some fundamental
limits [9, 10], e.g., linear bound or Pirandola-Laurenza-
Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound [10], on secret key rate
versus channel transmittance without quantum repeater.
Remarkablely, twin-field (TF) QKD protocol, pro-
posed by Lucamarini et al. [11], is capable of overcoming
this limit. TF-QKD, known as a measurement device
independent (MDI) QKD [4] type protocol, uses single-
photon click rather than two-photon click in previous
MDI-QKD to beat the limit. Because of this dramatic
breakthrough, a variant of TF-QKD protocols haven
been proposed consequentially [12–17]. Among these TF
type QKD, phase-matching (PM) [12] QKD protocol re-
quires Alice and Bob to do continuous phase random-
ization in code mode. In other three protocols [14–16],
Alice and Bob are only required to modulate two oppo-
site phase randomly in code mode. By a fair comparison
through numerical simulation, it seems that PM QKD
protocol generates lower secret key at short distance but
has longer transmission distance than the other three pro-
tocols. Intuitively, there may exist a more general TF
type QKD to cover these four protocols above.
In this paper,inspired by the idea of disrete phase
randomization of BB84 QKD protocol [18], we intro-
duce a more general TF-QKD, in which Alice and Bob
are required to modulate 2M discrete phase randomly
in code mode. In other word, Alice and Bob encode
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classical bit ”0”, ”1” in to phase 0, pi respectively,
then, randomize them by randomly adding a phase from
0, pi/M, 2pi/M, . . . , (M − 1)pi/M . Besides, our protocol is
suitable with and without post-selection in decoy mode
[19–22]. We present a security proof for TF-QKD pro-
tocol with discrete phase randomization against collec-
tive attack, which has been proven as the most powerful
attack in asymptotic scenarios [23]. The security proof
indicates that the transmission distance become longer
withM exponentially increasing, as a trade-off, the secret
key rate will be lower at short distance. When M tends
to infinity, our protocol is almost same with PM-QKD,
and the transmission distance comes to a limitation. Be-
sides, numerical simulations show that the transmission
distance can be almost expanded to the limition with
M = 2.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe details of TF-QKD protocol with discrete phase
randomization. In Sec. III, we present the security proof
of this protocol as well as an explicit formula for secure
key rate. In Sec. IV, we analyze the secret key rate
when choosing different M and do numerical simulation
with infinite decoy states. In Sec. V, we analyze its per-
formance when post-selection in decoy mode is removed,
which is quite convenient in experiment. Finally, in Sec.
VI, we come to a conclusion.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Twin-field quantum key distribution protocol with dis-
crete phase randomization runs as follows.
PROTOCOL I
Step 1. Alice and Bob randomly choose code mode or
decoy mode in each trial.
Step 2. If a code mode is selected, Alice (Bob) ran-
domly generates a key bit ka (kb) and a random number
x (y) and then prepares the coherent state
∣∣αei(ka+ xM )pi〉
2(
∣∣αei(kb+ yM )pi〉), where x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1}. If de-
coy mode is selected, Alice (Bob) generates a ramdom
phase φa ∈ [0, 2pi) (φb ∈ [0, 2pi)) and emits coherent state∣∣βaeiφa〉 (∣∣βbeiφb〉), where βa (βb) is randomly chosen
from a pre-decided set.
Step 3. Alice and Bob send their quantum states to
the untrusted receiver Eve. For each trial, only three
outcomes are legal, which are ”Only detector L clicks”,
”Only detector R clicks” and ”No detectors click”, an-
other outcome ”Both detectors click” is considered as
”No detectors click”, consequentially, Eve announces one
of the four outcomes.
Step 4. Alice and Bob repeat the above steps many
times. Alice and Bob publicly announce which trials are
code modes and which trials are decoy mode. For each
trial that both Alice and Bob select code mode, the raw
key bit is generated only if x = y and Eve announces a
successful detection. Alice and Bob keep ka, kb as their
raw key if Eve announces ”Only detector L clicks”. Bob
filps his bit if Eve announces ”Only detector R clicks”.
For each trial that both Alice and Bob select decoy mode,
Alice and Bob announce βa with random phase φa and
βb with random phase φb, and only keep the trial that
βa = βb and |φa − φb| = 0 or pi.
Step 5. Alice and Bob perform information reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification to extract the final secure
key.
III. SECURITY PROOF
Here, we present security proof of twin field protocol
with discrete phase randomization. Firstly, we analyze
the composite states shared by Alice and Bob when they
both select the decoy mode. In the case of βa = βb = β
and φa = φb = φ, the composite state of Alice and Bob
can be written as
ρAB =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∣∣βeiφ〉 ∣∣βeiφ〉 〈βeiφ∣∣ 〈βeiφ∣∣
=
∞∑
n=0
Pn |n,+〉 〈n,+|
(1)
where the fock state is defined as
|n,+〉 = 1√
2nn!
(a† + b†)n |00〉AB (2)
with probability Pn. In the case of βa = βb = β and
φa = φb+pi(mod 2pi)= φ, the composite state of Alice of
Bob can be written as
ρAB =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∣∣βeiφ〉 ∣∣−βeiφ〉 〈βeiφ∣∣ 〈−βeiφ∣∣
=
∞∑
n=0
Pn |n,−〉 〈n,−|
(3)
where the fock state is defined as
|n,−〉 = 1√
2nn!
(a† − b†)n |00〉AB (4)
with probability Pn.
In what follows, we concentrate on bounding Eve’s
Holevo information. Eve’s general collective attack can
be given by
UEve |n,±〉AB |e〉E =√
Y Ln,±
∣∣γLn,±〉 |L〉+
√
Y Rn,±
∣∣γRn,±〉 |R〉+
√
Y Nn,±
∣∣γNn,±〉 |N〉
(5)
where state |e〉E is Eve’s ancilla. Then, Eve is sup-
posed to announce one of legal outcomes ”Only detec-
tor L clicks” ”Only detector R clicks” and ”No de-
tectors click” determined by her measurement results
”|L〉,|R〉,|N〉”, respectively. In the case of βa = βb and
φa = φb,
∣∣γLn,+〉, ∣∣γRn,+〉 and ∣∣γNn,+〉 are some arbitray
quantum states after Eve’s evolution, Y Ln,+, Y
R
n,+ and
Y Nn,+ that satisfy the constraint Y
L
n,+ + Y
R
n,++Y
N
n,+ = 1
are the yields, both of which are referred to Eve’s mea-
surement results ”|L〉,|R〉,|N〉” respectively. Similarly, in
the case of βa = βb and |φa − φb| = pi,
∣∣γLn,−〉, ∣∣γRn,−〉
and
∣∣γNn,−〉 are some arbitray quantum states after Eve’s
evolution, Y Ln,−, Y
R
n,− and Y
N
n,− that satisfy the constraint
Y Ln,− + Y
R
n,−+Y
N
n,− = 1 are the yields, both of which are
referred to Eve’s measurement results ”|L〉,|R〉,|N〉” re-
spectively.
Without loss of generality, we firstly consider the secret
key rate when her measurement result is ”|L〉”. When
Alice and Bob both select code mode, the initial pre-
pared state
∣∣αei(ka+ xM pi)〉 and ∣∣αei(kb+ yM pi)〉, with keeping
matchedbasis trivals x = y, can be given by
∣∣αei xM pi〉 ∣∣αei xM pi〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pne
inxpi
M |n,+〉 , ka = kb = 0
∣∣−αei xM pi〉 ∣∣−αei xM pi〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pne
in(M+x)pi
M |n,+〉 , ka = kb = 1
∣∣αei xM pi〉 ∣∣−αei xM pi〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pne
inxpi
M |n,−〉 , ka = 0, kb = 1
∣∣−αei xM pi〉 ∣∣αei xM pi〉 =
∞∑
n=0
√
Pne
in(M+x)pi
M |n,−〉 , ka = 1, kb = 0
(6)
For the sake of simplicity, we define unnormalized states
∣∣∣ψL/R2M+j,±
〉
=
∞∑
n=0
√
P2Mn+jY
L/R
2Mn+j,±
∣∣∣γL/R2Mn+j,±
〉
(7)
where j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2M − 1}. We also define other
unmormalized states composed by the states above
∣∣∣ψL/Rex,±
〉
=
M−1∑
j=0
ei
2jxpi
M
∣∣∣ψL/R2M+2j,±
〉
∣∣∣ψL/Rox,±
〉
=
M−1∑
j=0
ei
(2j+1)xpi
M
∣∣∣ψL/R2M+2j+1,±
〉 (8)
After Eve’s attack according to Eq.(5) and her announc-
ing ”|L〉”, Alice and Bob keep trials only if x = y. Thus,
3the state of Eve conditioned on Alice’s classial bit can be
given by
ρLAEx =
1
2
|0〉A 〈0| ⊗ (P{
∣∣ψLex,+〉+ ∣∣ψLox,+〉}
+ P{∣∣ψLex,−〉+ ∣∣ψLox,−〉}) + 12 |1〉A 〈1|
⊗ (P{
∣∣ψLex,+〉− ∣∣ψLox,+〉}+ P{∣∣ψLex,−〉− ∣∣ψLox,−〉})
(9)
where we define P{|x〉} = |x〉 〈x|. The probability of
Alice obtaining a shifted key (x = y) in a code mode
when Eve announces ”|L〉” is
QLx =
1
2
(|
∣∣ψLex,+〉 |2+| ∣∣ψLox,+〉 |2+| ∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2+| ∣∣ψLox,−〉 |2)
(10)
When Eve announces ”|L〉”, an error click occurs if ka ⊕
kb = 1, thus, the error rate of shifted key (x = y) is given
by
eLx =
|
∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψLox,−〉 |2
| ∣∣ψLex,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψLox,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψLox,−〉 |2
=
|
∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψLox,−〉 |2
2QLx
(11)
Thanks to the strong subadditivity of von Neumann en-
tropy, Eve’s Holevo information with her announcing
”|L〉” is given by
ILAEx ≤ (1− eLx )H(
| ∣∣ψLex,+〉 |2
2(1− eLx )QLx
) + eLxH(
| ∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2
2eLxQ
L
x
)
(12)
where H(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1− x) is binary
Shannon entropy. The condition for equality of Eq.(12)
is that
∣∣ψLex,+〉, ∣∣ψLox,+〉, ∣∣ψLex,−〉, ∣∣ψLox,−〉 are mutual or-
thogonal with each other. For each trial that x = y and
Eve announces ”|L〉”, the secret key rate is given by
RLx = Q
L
x (1− fH(eLx )− ILAEx) (13)
where f is error correction efficiency. What we need to
do next is to calculate the average secret key rate for
different x when Eve announces ”|L〉”. Without consid-
ering sifting factor, the average secret key rate when Eve
announces ”|L〉” is given by
RL =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
RLx =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
QLx (1− fH(eLx )− ILAEx)
(14)
We define average gain QL and average error rate eL of
shifted key, which are given by
QL =
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
QLx
eL =
∑M−1
x=0 Q
L
xe
L
x∑M−1
x=0 Q
L
x
(15)
Thanks to the concavity of binary Shannon entropy, we
utilize Jensen’s inequality to minimize RL. For the sec-
ond term of Eq.(12) on the right, we have
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
QLxe
L
x ≤ QLH(
1
M
∑M−1
x=0 Q
L
xe
L
x
QL
) = QLH(eL)
(16)
The condition for equality of Eq.(16) is that eL0 = e
L
1 =
. . . = eLM−1. Similarly, for the third term of Eq.(12) on
the right, we have
1
M
M−1∑
x=0
QLx I
L
AEx
≤ 1
M
M−1∑
x=0
QLx [(1 − eLx )H(
| ∣∣ψLex,+〉 |2
2(1− eLx )QLx
) + eLxH(
| ∣∣ψLex,−〉 |2
2eLxQ
L
x
)]
≤QL[(1− eL)H(
∑M−1
x=0 |
∑M−1
j=0 e
i 2jxpi
M
∣∣ψL2M+2j,+〉 |2
2(1− eL)QL )
+ eLH(
∑M−1
x=0 |
∑M−1
j=0 e
i 2jxpi
M
∣∣ψL2M+2j,−〉 |2
2eLQL
)]
=QL[(1− eL)H(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,+〉 |2
2(1− eL)QL )
+ eLH(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,−〉 |2
2eLQL
)]
=QLILAE
(17)
where ILAE is defined by Eq.(17). Consequently, we have
RL ≥ QL(1− fH(eL)− ILAE) (18)
When Eve’s measurement result is ”|R〉”, the analysis
of secret key rate is almost same with the ones when she
announces ”|L〉”. Thus, the secret key rate when Eve
announces ”|R〉” is given by
RR ≥ QR(1− fH(eR)− IRAE) (19)
where IRAE is given by
IRAE = (1 − eR)H(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψR2M+2j,−〉 |2
2(1− eR)QR )
+ eRH(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψR2M+2j,+〉 |2
2eRQR
)]
(20)
The trials when Eve’s measurement result is ”|N〉” will
not contribute to the secret key. Thus, the total secret
key rate is R = RL +RR. The total gain and total error
rate of shifted key are given by
Q = QL +QR
e =
QLeL +QReR
Q
(21)
4In order to find the lower bound of the total secret key
rate R, we utilize the technique as well as Eq.(16) and
Eq.(17). Thus, we have
QLH(eL) +QRH(eR) ≤ QH(Q
LeL +QReR
Q
) = QH(e)
(22)
The condition for equality of Eq.(22) is that eL = eR = e.
Similarly, we have
QLILAE +Q
RIRAE
≤Q[(1− e)H(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j,−〉 |2
2(1− e)Q )
+ eH(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j,+〉 |2
2eQ
)]
=QIAE
(23)
Consequently, the total secret key rate formula can be
expressed by
R ≥ 1
M
Q(1− fH(e)− IAE) (24)
where IAE is defined by Eq.(23), 1/M is the shifting fac-
tor.
The problem finding the lower bound of the total secret
key rate can be converted into finding the upper bound
of IAE .
IAE = (1− e)H(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j,−〉 |2
2(1− e)Q )
+ eH(
∑M−1
j=0 |
∣∣ψL2M+2j,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j,+〉 |2
2eQ
)
0 ≤|
∣∣∣ψL/R2M+j,±
〉
|2 ≤ |
∞∑
n=0
√
P2Mn+jY
L/R
2Mn+j,±|2
M−1∑
j=0
|
∣∣ψL2M+2j,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψL2M+2j+1,+〉 |2 = 2(1− eL)QL
M−1∑
j=0
| ∣∣ψL2M+2j,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψL2M+2j+1,−〉 |2 = 2eLQL
M−1∑
j=0
|
∣∣ψR2M+2j,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j+1,−〉 |2 = 2(1− eR)QR
M−1∑
j=0
|
∣∣ψR2M+2j,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+2j+1,+〉 |2 = 2eRQR
(25)
With another constraint given by Eq.(21), we can finally
find the maximum of IAE .
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we simulate the performance of TF-
QKD with discrete phase modulation. The simulation
parameters are given in Table I. In ideal case, Alice and
Bob can estimate Y
L/R
n,± precisely by infinite decoy-state
method.
We assume that the transmission efficiency of channel
losses and detection efficiencies is η and dark counting
rate of single photon detectors (SPD) is d per trial. As-
suming the mean photon number of each pulse emitted
by Alice and Bob is µ, the counting rate is given by
Q = (1− d)(1 − e−2ηµ) + 2d(1− d)e−2ηµ
= (1− d)(1 − e−2ηµ + 2de−2ηµ) (26)
We assume that the optical misalignment is emis, the
error rate should be
e =
(1− d)[emis − (emis − d)e−2ηµ]
Q
(27)
Applying infinite decoy states, Y
L/R
n,± can be given by
Y Ln,+ = Y
R
n,− = (1− d)[1 − emis − (1− emis − d)(1 − η)n]
Y Ln,− = Y
R
n,+ = (1− d)[emis − (emis − d)(1 − η)n]
(28)
With Eq.(28), we can reconstruct Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion IAE and its constraint. We define
Y Ln,+ = Y
R
n,− = Y
c
n
Y Ln,− = Y
R
n,+ = Y
e
n
Xc2M+j =
| ∣∣ψL2M+j,+〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+j,−〉 |2
2
Xe2M+j =
|
∣∣ψL2M+j,−〉 |2 + | ∣∣ψR2M+j,+〉 |2
2
(29)
Thus, we have an equivalent expression of IAE and its
TABLE I. Parameters
Parameters Values
Dark count rate d 8× 10−8
Error correction efficiency f 1.15
Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
Misalignment error emis 1.5%
5constraint.
IAE = (1− e)H(
∑M−1
j=0 X
c
2M+2j
(1− e)Q ) + eH(
∑M−1
j=0 X
e
2M+2j
eQ
)
0 ≤Xc2M+j ≤ |
∞∑
n=0
√
P2Mn+jY c2Mn+j |2
0 ≤Xe2M+j ≤ |
∞∑
n=0
√
P2Mn+jY e2Mn+j |2
M−1∑
j=0
Xc2M+2j +X
c
2M+2j+1 = (1− e)Q
M−1∑
j=0
Xe2M+2j +X
e
2M+2j+1 = eQ
(30)
For the sake of analyzing IAE , we define the upper bound
of
∑M−1
j=0 X
c/e
2M+2j as a function for positive integer M ,
which is given by
F c/e(M) =
M−1∑
j=0
|
∞∑
n=0
√
P2Mn+jY
c/e
2Mn+j |2 (31)
As binary Shannon entropy H(x) increases when 0 ≤
x ≤ 1/2 and decreases when 1/2 ≤ x ≤ 1, it’s sufficient
to consider the case of F c(M) ≤ (1−e)Q/2 and F e(M) ≤
eQ/2 when finding the upper bound of IAE . It’s easy to
prove that
F c/e(1) ≥ F c/e(M) ≥ F c/e(NM) ≥ F c/e(∞) (32)
where N is a positive integer. With M exponentially
increasing, the upper bound of IAE decreases to the ex-
tend that the transmission distance become longer, as a
trade-off, the sifting cost grows so that secret key rate de-
creases at short distance. When M tends to infinity, the
transmission distance come to a limitation. With several
specialM , we present the numerical simulations of serect
key rate in Fig.1 and the maximal channel loss in Table
II.
If we remove the sifting efficiency, the limitary channel
loss withM →∞ is 81.5 dB as it’s showed in Table II. As
we can see in Fig.1, it’s sufficient to apply TF-QKD with
M = 2 that it almost reaches the limitary transmission
distance at the cost of about half of secret key rate at
short distance.
Here, we consider the relationship with several vari-
etal TF-QKD protocol [12, 14–16]. When M → ∞, our
TABLE II. The maximal channel loss with different M .
M The maximal channel loss (dB)
1 72.3
2 80.8
4 81.3
∞ 81.5
PLOB bound
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FIG. 1. Secret key rate R versus channel loss: The curves
represent the secure key rate of TF-QKD protocol for M = 1,
M = 2, M = 4 and the PLOB bound respectively. We do not
show the case of M →∞ because the key rate tends to 0
protocol is exactly the PM-QKD [12] if we relax the post-
selection condition |φa − φb| = 0 or pi and add a corre-
spongding sifting factor. When M = 1, our protocol is
same with [14–16] in code mode, the difference is the way
to estimate the information leakage or the ”phase error”.
To some extent, TF-QKD protocol with discrete phase
randomization cover the four varietal TF-QKD protocol
above.
V. REMOVING POST-SELECTION IN DECOY
MODE
For the simplicity in experiments, we can remove post-
selection in decoy mode in our protocol. Secutiry proof
shows that the simplified procotol reserves the capabil-
ity of overcoming PLOB bound. Raw key generation in
simplified protocol runs as follows.
PROTOCOL II
Step 1. Same as Protocol I
Step 2. Same as Protocol I
Step 3. Alice and Bob send their quantum states to
the untrusted receiver Eve. For each trial, only three
outcomes are legal in code mode, which are ”Only de-
tector L clicks”, ”Only detector R clicks” and ”No de-
tectors click”, another outcome ”Both detectors click”
is considered as ”No detectors click”, consequentially,
Eve announces one of the four outcomes. For each trial
that both Alice and Bob select decoy mode, the outcome
”Both detectors click” is considered as an legal outcome.
Step 4. Alice and Bob repeat the above steps many
times. Alice and Bob publicly announce which trials are
code modes and which trials are decoy mode. For each
trial that both Alice and Bob select code mode, the raw
key bit is generated only if x = y and Eve announces a
successful detection. Alice and Bob keep ka, kb as their
raw key if Eve announces ”Only detector L clicks”. Bob
filps his bit if Eve announces ”Only detector R clicks”.
6For each trial that both Alice and Bob select decoy mode,
the yield Y
′
n,m, probability of Eve announcing the out-
come ”Detectors click” provided Alice emits n-photon
state and Bob emits m-photon state, can be estimated.
The outcome ”Detectors click” includes ”Only detector
L clicks” ”Only detector R clicks” and ”Both detectors
click”.
Step 5. Same as Protocol I
The security proof of this simplified protocol is same as
the one with post-selection in decoy mode. In simplified
protocol, however, we can get a upper bound of Y
c/e
n
by infinite decoy states rather than estimate it exactly,
which is given by
√
Y
L/R
n,± ≤
n∑
k=0
√
Ckn
2n
Y ′k,n−k (33)
PLOB bound
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M=4
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FIG. 2. Secret key rate R versus channel loss for the protocol
withot post-selection in decoy mode: The curves represent
the secure key rate of TF-QKD protocol for M = 1, M = 2,
M = 4 and the PLOB bound respectively. We do not show
the case of M →∞ because the key rate tends to 0
Similarly, with Eq.(30), we present the numerical sim-
ulations of serect key rate in Fig.2 and the maximal chan-
nel loss in Table III for the simplified protocol. We get
an analogous result compared to the protocol with post-
selection in decoy mode. In simplified protocol, the lim-
itary channel loss with M → ∞ is 75.8 dB showed in
Table III when removing the sifting efficiency. As we can
see in Fig.2, it’s sufficient to apply this simplified TF-
QKD with M = 2 that it almost reaches the limitary
transmission distance at the cost of about half of secret
TABLE III. The maximal channel loss with different M for
the protocol withot post-selection in decoy mode.
M The maximal channel loss (dB)
1 67.0
2 75.3
4 75.8
∞ 75.8
key rate at short distance. When we compare our proto-
col with and without post-selection in decoy mode, the
latter one does not require post-selection in decoy mode,
as a trade-off, the maximal channel loss will be lower.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have introduced a TF type QKD with
discrete phase randomizationn and proven its security
in asymptotic scenarios. Our protocol can be viewed as
a generalization of the four varietal TF-QKD protocol
[12, 14–16] to some extent. The security proof discloses
that the transmission distance become longer with M
exponentially increasing, as a trade-off, the secret key
rate will be lower at short distance. When M tends to
infinity, the transmission distance come to a limitation.
Numerical simulations show that it’s sufficient to apply
TF-QKD with M = 2, for it almost reaches the limitary
transmission distance at the cost of about half of secret
key rate, compared with the case of M = 1, at short
distance. Post-selection in decoy mode is not convenient
in experiment, thus, we remove it to make experiments
more simpler in a modified protocol. We find that the
removal of post-selection in decoy mode has very limited
influence on the secret key rate and achievable distance.
Our findings expect TF-QKD can be run with optimal
phase randomization actively, i.e. at short distance one
can simply bypass phase randomization while a phase
randomization of 0 or pi/2 is sufficient at long distance
case.
VII. NOTE ADDED
During the preparation of this paper, we find that Pri-
maatmaja et al. [24] proposed an open question that
if coding phase in TF-QKD under different bases can
improve secret key rate significantly. Their idea is simi-
lar with our proposal of discrete phase randomization in
some sense.
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